The art of democracy—art as a tool for developing democratic citizenship and stimulating public debate: a Rortyan-Deweyan account by Raeber, Michael I
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2013
The art of democracy—art as a tool for developing democratic citizenship
and stimulating public debate: a Rortyan-Deweyan account
Raeber, Michael I
Abstract: Unbekannt
DOI: 10.3390/h2020176
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-78574
Veröffentlichte Version
Originally published at:
Raeber, Michael I (2013). The art of democracy—art as a tool for developing democratic citizen-
ship and stimulating public debate: a Rortyan-Deweyan account. Humanities, 2(2):176-192. DOI:
10.3390/h2020176
Humanities 2013, 2, 176–192; doi:10.3390/h2020176 
 
humanities 
ISSN 2076-0787 
www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities 
Article 
The Art of Democracy—Art as a Tool for Developing 
Democratic Citizenship and Stimulating Public Debate:  
A Rortyan-Deweyan Account 
Michael I. Raeber 
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zurich, 
Switzerland; E-Mail: michael.raeber@phil.gess.ethz.ch; Tel.: +41-44-633-1561;  
Fax: +41-44-632-1561 
Received: 27 March 2013; in revised form: 19 April 2013 / Accepted: 25 April 2013 /  
Published: 6 May 2013 
 
Abstract: Richard Rorty holds that the novel is the characteristic genre of democracy, 
because it helps people to develop and to stabilize two crucial capabilities the ideal 
inhabitants of democratic societies should possess: a keen sense for anti-foundationalism 
and a disposition for solidarity. He believes that novels help develop these capabilities by 
educating our capacity for criticism and our capacity for attentive-empathetic perception. 
This article argues in favor of this Rortyan idea, showing how anti-foundationalism and 
solidarity can be seen as important instances of what I will call 'dispositions for democratic 
citizenship' and that art (and not only novels) and its reception, are valuable tools for 
advancing these dispositions. However, as the Rortyan public-private dichotomy assigns 
art’s function of criticism only to the private sphere, Rorty ignores its potential for 
stimulating democratic public deliberation and he misses the fact that art’s functions of 
criticism and of attentive-empathetic perception partially depend on each other if they are 
effectively to lead to increased solidarity and change social realities. Thus this article 
argues—taking these objections into account—to slightly modify, but nevertheless value 
Rorty’s idea that art and its reception are crucial resources for democratic citizenship and 
for the process of democratic deliberation. 
Keywords: aesthetics and philosophy of art; anti-foundationalism; democracy; democratic 
citizenship; Dewey; political criticism; pragmatism and neo-pragmatism; public debate; 
Rorty 
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1. Introduction 
Richard Rorty argues that the novel is “most closely associated with the struggle for freedom and 
equality” and thus is the primary instrument of moral reflection in a democratic society [1]. He holds, 
that by educating our sentiments, novels can help to fashion a democratic moral society of individuals 
aware of the suffering of others and likely to be willing to integrate those different from us into what 
‘we’ are. Rorty emphasizes that democracy is necessarily linked to the plurality and contingency of 
human perspectives, and as great novels inherently display this pluralism and contingency, they are for 
him the primary instruments for influencing—what one could call—the ‘political psychology’ of 
individuals so that they might be educated to act democratically, that is for Rorty to aspire towards 
freedom, equality and a form of loyalty to other human beings. 
In order to understand why Rorty believes that novels and narratives in general are the primary 
instruments for building up an individual’s capacities and motivation to think and act in accordance to 
the ideals of democracy, we have to take into account his meta-philosophical conviction. This is that 
shifting the focus of political theory away from a preoccupation with aloof attempts to obtain a set of 
universal truths about politics towards the idea of redescription as political intervention makes political 
reflection much more effective in terms of actually shaping or reinforcing the individual’s preferences 
for equality, freedom and other ideals and institutions that are relevant for democracies. Redescription 
for Rorty is transformational rather than representational, words and knowledge for Rorty should be 
seen as instruments of change rather than as accurate representations of reality. With the idea of 
redescription as political theory, Rorty demands that philosophical-political reflection should inspire us 
to abandon our attitude of passive spectatorship in favor of embracing direct engagement, in short: 
philosophical political reflection should be practiced as political intervention. And that is for Rorty 
best done in crafted novels and imaginative visions designed not to illuminate truth but to deploy 
perspectives designed to inspire change. Rorty is convinced that redescriptions in the shape of novels 
produce amendment by assisting us to “alter our self-image” [2]. He sees them as sources for an 
intellectual reflection that deal with the details, particulars and archetypal characters of individuals and 
situations that are formative for individual dispositions or social structures. However, not only are 
novels, films and other artistic creations informative sources for intellectual reflection, moreover they 
can, at least this is Rorty’s hope, take formative action in individual political passions and preferences. 
This article will argue in favor of the Rortyan idea that anti-foundationalism and solidarity are 
important instances of what I will call 'dispositions for democratic citizenship’ and that not only novels 
but art in general and its reception are valuable tools for supporting those dispositions by means of 
criticism and education of perception. I show first how to make sense of his claim that those ‘virtues’ 
are crucial for democratic citizenship. Second I outline what Rorty believes are the connections 
between those dispositions and art and its reception. I then argue that, as the Rortyan public-private 
dichotomy assigns art’s function of criticism only to the private sphere, Rorty ignores its potential for 
stimulating democratic public deliberation and that he misses the fact that art’s functions of criticism 
and of aesthetic-moral perception partially depend on each other if they are effectively to lead to 
increasing solidarity and changing social realities. I put forward elements of John Dewey’s concept of 
art that removes deficiencies left by Rorty. Thus, finally, I suggest—taking these objections into 
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account—to slightly modify, but nevertheless value Rorty’s idea that art and its reception are crucial 
resources for democratic citizenship and for the process of democratic deliberation. 
2. Two Dispositions of the Ideal-Typical Democratic Citizen: Anti-Foundationalism  
and Solidarity 
The inhabitants of Rortyan liberal democratic utopia, the “liberal ironists”, exemplify Rorty’s ideal 
for participants of western democracy. Liberal ironists stand firm in their believed values while at the 
same time accepting the contingency of these very values. The awareness of contingency even 
designates their self-perceptions; ironists constitute their identities through constant self-relativization 
and self-re-creation and understand themselves as antithetical to the ‘metaphysician’ who is tempted to 
regard a given final vocabulary, which for Rorty everybody inevitably has, as fixed, natural, and not 
amenable to contingency. All vocabularies (including their own) are submitted to the ironists’ 
criticisms implying that they dissociate from existing vocabularies by creating new words, meanings 
and stories. In this manner personal identity becomes constituted as the “center of narrative  
gravity” [3]—a narrating consideration of one’s life that is constantly revised. By renouncing any 
foundational argumentation or legitimation, the ironists release their creative powers in order to create 
their own contingencies. ‘Liberal Ironists’, then, are ‘anti-foundationalists’. 
The term ‘anti-foundationalism’ is vague and ambiguous. It is defined primarily ex negativo, 
denying any foundationalist demand that would give answers to questions of truth and correspondence 
vis-à-vis some noncontextual or unhistorical realities or values. Foundationalist claims imply 
furthermore that ideas ought to exist which we can know with absolute certainty. The reason for that 
demand lies in a fear of a skeptic-relativistic disorientation. In a quote from Frege’s The Foundations 
of Arithmetic (Grundlagen der Arithmetik) this fear is explicitly addressed: “If everything were in 
continual flux, and nothing maintained itself fixed for a1l time, there would no longer be any 
possibility of getting to know anything about the world and everything would be plunged in 
confusion” [4]. That fear of Frege is opposed by the fear of Rorty that any possible foundational claim 
is in danger of being authoritarian and oppressive, insofar as foundational claims get their force (to 
speak with Peirce) either from God, God-like humans or unconditional a-priori principles. With regard 
to Rorty these three features of anti-foundationalism (anti-realism; fallibilism; fear from coercion) can 
be expressed with his epistemological claims of “anti-representationalism”, “contingency” and the 
ethical claim of “humanism”. With regard to the latter, Rorty called his position a “militant  
anti-authoritarianism” [5]. It’s rather strange that he attaches this fear only to ahistorical justifications, 
as it is easy to see how historicized justifications that are based on principles and practices of a certain 
ethnos are, just the same, susceptible to be authoritarian. However, what Rorty—more positively 
expressed—means is what Bernstein characterizes as Rorty’s “deep humanism” [6]. Humanism here 
means that anti-foundationalism should primarily be understood as a humanistic mindset, namely that 
there is nothing that we can rely on but ourselves and our fellow human beings. Of course, our fellow 
human beings could be an authoritarian source as well. However, humans at least have the ability and 
most likely the duty to legitimate their actions and dispositions, rocks in turn do not have such skills 
and duties, as they do not act and do not have any dispositions.  
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One could assume that ironist and anti-foundationalist citizens are not approximately identical, as 
for Rorty an ironist is someone who “has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she 
currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies” and because ironists would be 
intellectuals while non-intellectuals would not be ironists [7]. “The latter would, however, be 
commonsensically nominalist and historicist” ([7], p. 87). The crucial difference between mere  
anti-foundational nominalist-historicist members of a Rortyan society and ironists seems to be that 
ironists, in addition to being nominalist and historicist, do maintain radical and unsolvable doubts 
about their own and other vocabularies. But as Michael Bacon points out, the difference between 
radical and commonsensical doubt is not that clear cut [8]. The difference between the radically 
doubting intellectual and the merely commonsensically doubting non-intellectual is reducible to a 
gradual difference in a tendency to doubt. While ironists might cultivate radical and unsolvable doubts 
towards all (their own and other) vocabularies and beliefs, they cannot question all coevally and with 
the same intensity. Ever since Peirce, the conviction that some beliefs are firmer than others or 
unlikely to change (and, in Rorty’s terms, are near to the core of “narrative gravity”) has been counted 
among the most basic principles of pragmatism. As Rorty says: “We call certain people ‘intellectuals’ 
because they have the brains and guts to keep their self-image flexible. … The difference between 
intellectuals and the masses is the difference between those who can remember and use different 
vocabularies at the same time, and those who can remember only one” [9]. As a result, the 
controversial notion of ironism can be simply substituted with the modest concept of anti-
foundationalism. Rorty concedes that “ironism … means something close to antifoundationalism. … It 
is just a sort of attitude, the way you feel about yourself, a form of life” ([9], p. 40). Of course, to have 
a decidedly anti-foundationalist mindset is a state that is hard to reach, because it seems paradoxical to 
be nothing more than a web of beliefs and to act upon them while at the same time being ready to stand 
back from exactly those beliefs by calling them into question. 
Yet, Rorty was ambiguous with what he really meant by “ironism”. There are passages in his 
writings that are vulnerable to attacks from critics of his concept of ironism, especially where he insists 
on quarantining ironism in the public sphere by privatizing it. If we think of ironists as having a  
light-hearted, laissez-faire and cynical attitude towards other people’s problems and desires and being 
merely concerned with the private task of pursuing their own selfish desires, we can understand why 
the Rortyan ironists are said to be incapable of participation as citizens or that if they would 
participate, they would do it only and throughout cynically. However, Neil Gascoigne convincingly 
demonstrates that such an interpretation of what Rorty meant with ironism would be a 
misunderstanding [10]. He points out that while the difference between intellectuals and  
non-intellectuals in their tendency to doubt is a gradual one, it nevertheless is significant for two 
reasons. Firstly, intellectuals who radically doubt any final vocabulary show a heightened alertness to 
‘moral inventions’. In other words, they are open to the fact that in regard to morality something better 
might arise. Secondly, in this connection, for Rorty, ironism is a normative mode of self-understanding 
for intellectuals. Ironists are existentially characterized by their awareness of both the fact that 
redescriptions often do humiliate other people and that their project of self-creation is not a creation ex 
nihil but is only parasitic upon normal language. Ironism, then, is an instance of what Rorty meant with 
humanism—that there is nothing that we can rely on but ourselves and our fellow human beings. 
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Brint/Weaver/Garmon argue that there lies no political theory in anti-foundationalism, from which 
no Leftist or Rightist politics could be derived from. They hold that “… no particular political position, 
practice, principle, doctrine, set of beliefs, or program follows from taking an anti-foundationalist 
stance”. And they go on arguing that “… anti-foundationalism is just as available to fascists as to 
Fabians, as open to purveyors of cruelty as to expanders of liberty” [11]. They are certainly right in 
pointing out that no particular political orientation follows from anti-foundationalism and that it neither 
rejects nor endorses any particular politics. But, in opposition to fascism, Fabianism and the like,  
anti-foundationalism and democracy both in their ways are related to the idea that all knowledge, 
values and all political decisions are hypothetical and fleeting and that they may be contested and 
replaced. Anti-foundationalism’s epistemological insight that there are no dependable final foundations 
of knowledge contains the crucial political lesson that there is no ensured final way of obtaining good 
politics, laws or institutions. As a consequence the democratic citizenry, consisting of a plurality of 
different individuals and interest groups, should be empowered to vote bad rulers out of office and 
expose bad policies. The political process of deliberation and voting in democracies can be compared 
to other experimental activities in which contestation and exploration leads to the amendment of 
deficient systems of representation. Consequently, anti-foundationalism does have a meaning for 
political theory—it seems to be incompatible with anti-democratic practices and is only compatible 
with democratic (political) settings. In democracies, political action is of experimental and provisional 
nature. Democracy itself, as Dewey highlighted, is unfinished, and ideal rather than a fact, “namely, 
the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, 
perfected. Since things do not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and interfered with, 
democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be” [12]. Democracy, to that effect, is an open-ended 
process without absolute authorities or outright certainties. Logically this means that anti-foundationalism 
is a necessary condition of democracy. This is not to deny that democracies do have solid and enduring 
fundaments—institutions, regulations, processes, patterns of action or communication—and that 
democratic decisions do have a strong path dependency making it difficult to reverse or modify them. 
Yet from a historical point of view one can claim that foundationalism often results in anti-democratic 
practices and governments. Consider for instance the fact that a non-democratic regime like Nazi-Germany 
grounded its actions and convictions on foundational ideals like ‘nation’ and ‘race’. Fascists would 
never adopt an anti-foundationalist attitude, because they could never give up the belief that there exist 
some absolute and certain ideas, ideals and practices. 
What follows is that, as Rortyan ironists are ‘refined’ anti-foundationalists, being an ironist in that 
sense (and that equals to thinking and acting in accordance with the idea of anti-foundationalism) is a 
necessary part of being a democratic citizen. Being an ironist (having an anti-foundationalist attitude) 
then can be compared to patterns of political socialization that are required for a democratic political 
culture to emerge or to be maintained, in which conflictual tensions among competing ways of life, 
identities and world views are tolerated and resolved without violence [13]. 
A strong sense for “solidarity” is the second important constituent of Rorty’s ideal-typical 
democratic citizen. The ideal democratic citizen for Rorty would grasp at increasing solidarity. That 
solidarity and democracy de facto go hand in hand is not hard to see as solidarity in modern liberal 
democracies, that is, in social democratic welfare states, is institutionalized in procedural and 
institutional settings. The individualistic normative notion of solidarity as compassion, sympathy or 
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understanding on part of the civil society manifests itself in democratic institutions and procedures that 
generally allow for minority groups to be heard and to influence politics. That is why for Rorty 
democracy is primarily a tool for those who are suffering. And being a tool for them, democracy leads 
to the reduction of their suffering: “In a fully democratic society, unnecessary suffering would not 
exist” ([9], p. 82). What “unnecessary suffering” here means remains under-determined; Rorty only 
refers to “the cruelty of whites against blacks, for example, or the suffering of gays” as examples of 
unnecessary suffering. If there exists unnecessary suffering, there must, logically, also exist necessary 
suffering or at least tolerable suffering. However, he does not give any examples of that. Besides, 
considering the nagging problem of the tyranny of the majority that has been raised by many critics of 
democracy, a direct link between democracy and solidarity is not obvious. If we understand democracy 
primarily or exclusively as a method to limit governmental power by voting once in a while, 
democracy will not have that much in common with solidarity. Be that it is not my aim here to 
contribute anything to the problem of how to establish and ensure minority rights, to the problem of 
how to build majorities or to the problem of foras or institutionalized channels where minorities can 
make their voices heard, I will ignore this problem in this instance. In any case, Rorty was convinced 
that democracy should be a tool for those who are suffering, although he was unclear about how to 
achieve this goal. 
Increasing solidarity for Rorty means that our sensitivity is enhanced with regard to the 
particularities of the suffering and humiliation of others and as a result it leads to a reduction of 
cruelty. He defines solidarity as,  
… accepting reciprocal responsibility to other members of the group for the sake of common purpose. In that 
sense the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had solidarity, the Nazis had solidarity, Mao’s cultural 
revolutionaries had solidarity. The bad guys can have solidarity too. Solidarity is morally neutral, so to  
speak ([9], p. 61). 
And furthermore he describes it as,  
… a sense of other people and ourselves being ‘we’—we feel that what affects them affects us because we, 
to some extent, identify with them. I was trying to describe social progress in a way borrowed from Wilfred 
Sellars: the expansion of ‘we’ consciousness, that is, the ability to take in more and more people of the sort 
fashionably called ‘marginal’ and think of them as one of us, included in us ([9], p. 32). 
Rorty uses “solidarity” in those passages in two different ways. First, solidarity for Rorty is a 
neutral social tool that has the function of creating a common identity, a ‘we’ (we Americans, we 
Ironists, we Aryans, …). Second, as being a neutral social tool it has to be put into service for the right 
end, and that end is for Rorty reducing cruelty. On an individualistic level Rorty’s notion of solidarity 
can be translated as compassion, sympathy or understanding towards other people. It is his hope that 
when we get affected by other people’s needs and sufferings and see them as our needs and sufferings 
that we feel bound to act in a way that reduces their sufferings and satisfies their needs. On the level of 
community solidarity for Rorty means, if I understand him right, the integration of other people into a 
liberal democratic ethnos. This is to say that Rorty’s concept of solidarity is more than just a morally 
neutral social tool, it is a normative concept as it includes an enlargement of our ‘we’, of our identity. 
Enlarging our ‘we’ can mean both including people who once were ‘other’ people into a prefixed ‘we’ 
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or redefining what ‘we’ is by giving new and extended meaning to it. And loyalty to a common ‘we’ 
can be an important engine of moral solidarity for Rorty. However, being loyal to a common ‘we’ in 
Rorty’s sense has two opposed and conflicting meanings. For one thing it means loyalty to real 
existing liberal democratic ethnoi (in Rorty’s case primarily the United States). For the other it means 
loyalty to the unattained but attainable ideals of liberal democracy, the liberal utopia. In other words, 
there is a tension between loyalty to the factual ‘we’ of identity and loyalty to the normative ‘we’ of a 
Sellersian ‘we-consciousness’. 
To sum up, Rorty’s ideal-typical democratic citizens are men and women who have internalized the 
habits of the mind and the habits of the heart—the dispositions for anti-foundationalism and 
solidarity—that are essential for the conduct of democratic self-government. As I have mentioned 
before, Rorty does believe that narratives in general and novels in particular are eligible tools to 
promote those two dispositions and that because of that novels thus should be called ‘the characteristic 
genre of democracy’. In the next 2 sections I will explain what he exactly means by that and in doing 
so I will both point out some internal difficulties and suggest taking into account art’s potential for 
aesthetic-moral perception and social criticism in general. 
3. Novel’s Political Function of Educating our Capacity for Aesthetic-Moral Perception 
We can identify in Rorty’s thought two conceptions of the role of novels in democratic societies [14]. 
On the one hand, novels for Rorty serve to install and stabilize common vocabularies or hopes and 
educate to a morality of solidarity with the aim of reducing cruelty. On the other they provide a means 
of criticism and self-creation. 
Let me first consider the moral-educating role Rorty assigns to novels. His idea of sentimental 
education through novels is based on a replacement of reason by imagination as the crucial human 
capability and emphasizes the role of sentiments in moral judgment. Sentimental novels, stories or 
pictures that display the suffering and pain of others and directly appeal to people’s sentiments, could 
lead for Rorty to a kind of moral progress toward a more humane social world. What Rorty believes 
happens when we are confronted with the suffering of others is that we enlarge our sense of identity, 
our ability to imaginatively identify with those suffering and as a result maybe we tend to reduce 
cruelty. By manipulating sentiments, for Rorty literature is best suited to the task of making us more 
sensitive to suffering. The function of imaginative identification with others includes two key features, 
both of them relevant in novels. 
First, imaginative novels can help us to notice sites of the suffering that have been unnoticed by 
bringing them to our attention. Second, in order to identify with other people’s fates we must know 
that they exist at all and for that we have to know details about their lives beforehand. Hence it is the 
task of novels to describe those fates in detail. These two integral aspects of novels can lead for Rorty 
to increasing our sensitivity to suffering and to the creation of fellow feeling. 
In The Art of the Novel Milan Kundera—one of Rorty’s references—describes the spirit of the 
novel in terms that remarkably resemble Rorty’s idea of anti-foundationalism. Kundera opposes the 
novel as the nature of foundational philosophy, the world of multiple, conflicting perspectives to the 
world of one single truth and a dictated, unquestionable reality. The novel’s function in that way is to 
contradict and subvert rather than to serve ideological certitudes. Kundera expresses this function with 
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terms that resemble Rorty’s liberal utopia: “ambiguity”, “tolerance”, “diversity”, “fraternity”, and the 
importance of a protected private life [15]. Nevertheless, other than Kundera who sees the novel by 
definition as the “ironic art”, Rorty does exclude the ironic (that is: anti-foundationalist) tools of 
subversion or contradiction from the public sphere; only for private matters, as a tool to become more 
autonomous, should irony be employed. One reason for that limitation is that irony for Rorty has the 
potential to humiliate and to be cruel ([7], pp. 87–89). We may concede that irony indeed has this 
potential, and if we understand it in the way Rorty does, namely as the primary tool for self-creation 
through discrimination from and negation of all other vocabulary, the very nature of anti-foundationalism 
would be to humiliate and to be cruel. Nonetheless, if the value of the novel for democracy is its 
capability to contradict any attempt to impose singular perspectives on diversity in Kundera’s sense, 
why should this function of contradiction be of more value for the private realm than for the public 
sphere? Contradiction and subversion only make sense in connection with some sort of public 
discourse. Undermining any foundational certainty would be an essential goal in the public sphere of 
any truly democratic society, even for the price of slightly humiliating other people who hold those 
foundational claims. 
Thus it is not so much anti-foundationalism which Rorty has in mind when he refers to novels as 
tools of moral-civic education that could eventually lead to an enhancement of solidarity, it is rather 
the idea that novels open up the moral imagination that would lead to a heightened awareness and 
sensitivity to the hardships of others. Richard Hart rightly described the Rortyean idea of the moral 
function of novels as “a line of evolution from opening the moral imagination, to enhanced  
sympathy-empathy, to cultivating proper moral sentiments, to expanded loyalty and the pursuit of 
greater justice” [16]. A novel like Nabokov’s Lolita for Rorty somehow can change its readers by 
offering new insights into themselves and others, perhaps reinforcing and increasing their appreciation 
of and compassion to those in need. They have the potential for the reader to see and experience the 
world from the perspective of the strong characters in a story. Rorty is certainly right to hold that in 
delivering a “diversity of viewpoints, a plurality of descriptions of the same events” those novels 
thereby illustrate deep pluralism ([1], p. 74). Non-reductive, or in other words, polyphonic novels 
deliver different—in many cases conflicting—views on the same event, without privileging one of 
these views. In other words, they are anti-foundationalist. That is Kundera’s point. But in addition to 
that, Rorty believes in the moral powers of novels to bring us to see other people’s sufferings and needs. 
The polyphonic quality of novels does not imply that on account of their particularity and 
attentiveness to the specifics of the lives of others, they will directly show people how to become 
better perceivers, and consequently alter them such that they act in more just and less cruel ways. 
Differently put, there is no linear line of evolution, as Rorty seems to have assumed, from reading 
polyphonic novels to the formation of moral sentiments and from there to a habit of acting upon the 
idea of solidarity. 
Let me illustrate my point with one of Rorty’s examples where we readers of polyphonic novels 
could sharpen our moral imagination. It is the scene in Nabokov’s Lolita where Humbert Humbert 
visits the barber of Kasbeam. It goes like this: 
In Kasbeam a very old barber gave me a very mediocre haircut: he babbled of a baseball-playing son of his, 
and, at every explodent, spat into my neck, and every now and then wiped his glasses on my sheet-wrap, or 
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interrupted his tremulous scissor work to produce faded newspaper clippings, and so inattentive was I that it 
came as a shock to realize as he pointed to an easelled photograph among the ancient gray lotions, that the 
moustached young ball player had been dead for the last thirty years [17]. 
For Rorty, this short scene represents Humbert's lack of attentiveness to anything irrelevant to his 
own idiosyncrasies, a lack of curiosity for the details of other people’s sufferings and their lives. This 
is a short scene, and the reader possibly will not notice the moral lesson that could be learned from this 
scene according to Rorty and Nabokov. The moral-educative effect of this scene for Rorty is not 
attained until the reader recognizes (with the help of Nabokov who in the afterword points out to the 
reader) that he or she was as inattentive to that scene, to that dead moustached son, as Humbert was 
inattentive. Thus the reader suddenly reveals to herself her accomplice in Humbert. This is the moral 
lesson that can be learned here for Rorty: “To notice what one is doing, and in particular to notice what 
people are saying. For it might turn out, it very often does turn out, that people are trying to tell you 
that they are suffering“ ([7], p. 164). 
It is a quite elaborate interpretation of that particular scene from both Rorty and Nabokov. 
However, I doubt that the learned effect from reading this scene could be something of a moral lesson. 
It is just not the same sort of curiosity that is lacking by overlooking an important passage in a fictional 
text to not noticing the suffering of existing fellow human beings. In one case we may discover with 
irritation that we did not see at first sight what we see now, namely that we missed one important piece 
of the story we read or heard, similar to the scientist who finds it dreadful that he missed an important 
fact necessary to make his theory better or more complete. In other words, what was lacking in this 
case is that we were not intellectually attentive enough, not intellectually accurate enough. In the case 
of actually ignoring the suffering of someone that I could and should have noticed, my indifference 
might have far-reaching consequences. I might then discover not with an aloof irritation that I missed 
an important part of a story, but I might emotionally, affectively, intellectually, maybe even physically 
grasp that the person suffering was indirectly or directly talking to me and that I should have tried to 
do something about that suffering. 
This is not an argument against the claim that novels influence our moral and political selves. I only 
refer to the gulf that lies between intellectually recognizing other people’s lives and acting on that 
recognition by not privileging any form of living. As Jenefer Robinson convincingly argues, novels 
indeed affect our emotions directly and pre-cognitive, but the cognitive reflection on perception and 
attentiveness is a very complicated and only secondary task. She argues against the assumption that 
“emotions are or entail beliefs or judgments, and that this cognitive component is the most 
fundamental aspect of emotion. Moral learning through reading fiction does not consist of the 
acquisition of beliefs. Learning about life by reading fiction would then seem to consist of the 
acquisition of beliefs”. This is too much of a mechanical model for her of what goes on in the 
emotional experience of novel-reading: “We will never be able to abstract a ‘message’ from a great 
novel by means of an after-the-fact summary of it” [18]. The emotional experience of reading a novel, 
she argues, is educational because emotions are tools for focusing our attention. True, by reading a 
novel I may acquire the belief that careful attention to and awareness of the details of a situation or 
person should be part of my own intellectual web of moral beliefs and habits. However, such reflective 
insights are the results of cognitive monitoring of the series of emotional experiences I have had over 
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the course of reading the novel. I am reflecting back on these experiences. Thus, the education I 
receive in reading the novel is not just a matter of acquiring these beliefs (that I should be more 
attentive). This has to do with the polyphonic structure of good novels. They ask questions but do not 
answer them unambiguously. They leave room for readers to engage in reflections on their emotional 
experience and its ethical implications. Hence, cognitive reflection and interpretation on moral and 
ethical issues have to take into account the openness and complexity of novels as well as the varied 
and complex emotional experiences of the readers. 
Rortyan literary intellectuals with their aloof interpretations may be of some assistance to some 
already well educated experts for cognitive reflection on reading-experiences. On the other hand, the 
vast majority of people are not such experts, real live teachers that help to transform the reader’s 
emotional reading-experiences by enacting these transformations before their eyes into something like 
moral beliefs or habits are very important. They use novels as training tools for such transformations. 
A philosophy of democracy that puts its hopes on a culture that is first and foremost democratic 
because it is an artistic culture has to be connected with philosophical reflections on education. The 
right novels, in order to fulfill the functions of criticism and of making us into better perceivers, have 
to be read in the right environment, and that means that novels, as any form of art, have to be taught 
and imparted [19]. 
The most considerable writing of Rorty on philosophy and education is “Education as Socialization 
and Individualization” [20]. However, this article is not a reflection on the processes of education but 
an analysis of the landscape of educational politics in the US at the time. Distinguishing between 
“lower education” (primary and secondary education) and “higher education”, Rorty sees the purpose 
of lower education in enculturation and socialization, “of getting the students to take over the moral 
and political common sense of the society as it is”, whereas the purpose of higher education would be 
to educate us in freedom, individuation and criticism by “inciting doubt and stimulating imagination, 
thereby challenging the prevailing consensus” ([20], pp. 116, 118). As for Rorty “education for 
freedom cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed”, socialization has to come before 
individuation. It is not hard to see that arranging lower and higher education in that way is a direct 
result of Rorty’s splitting-up of the private and the public realm (and is in accordance with the two 
functions he ascribes to novels). On exactly how we should envisage these concrete processes of lower 
and higher education Rorty does not say much, he instead refers to Dewey’s theory of education that 
for him already outlined this task. However, this reference to Dewey seems to be nothing but some sort of 
lip service [21]. It is not only that Rorty did not have much to say about education and democracy, he 
was convinced that philosophy has nothing to say about education, as philosophy’s function cannot be 
to formulate any sort of theory but rather should be seen in its therapeutic use [22]. 
Still, Rorty acknowledged that novels are not successful in enhancing our powers of moral 
perception when they are read as—what I call—allegories for a particular moral theory or ideology. 
What do I mean by ‘allegories’? To attribute novels an allegoric function means to treat them as a 
lively example for a general idea or principle. To treat novels as training instruments for moral and 
political education on the other hand would attribute to them a much more instrumental function, 
instrumental insofar, as novels as training instruments amplify personal experiences and by that 
influence future personal action. Referring to Harold Bloom, Rorty “regards ideology—in the sense of 
a set of general ideas which provide a context in which the reader places every book she reads—as an 
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enemy of autonomy” [23], and, one could add, as an enemy of reader sensibility. Rorty’s account of 
novels as powerful tools for enhancing our moral imagination is thus opposed to the view that novels 
seek to enunciate general moral or ethical principles. Such principles are not in novels, and thus no 
general moral lessons should be extracted from the concrete situations portrayed in literature, in 
particular, from the rich, finely woven, detailed situations that characterize polyphonic novels. They 
are complex and ambiguous as they display simultaneously many voices that cannot be reduced to one 
moral generality. Suppressing complexity would mean the reduction of existence to thin, stereotypical 
caricatures and would in effect deny the resources—the ambiguity, paradox and complexity of 
existence—necessary for changing the conventions. Thus, novels that instruct us on how to live 
morally can be discerned from novels that do not instruct us on how to live morally but rather only 
implicitly ask questions on how we want to live at all. 
Rorty’s hope that getting inside the skin of others would induce us to break up fixed (moral) 
principles and worldviews is close to John Dewey’s and Martha Nussbaum’s concepts of literature and 
art as training instruments for educating our power of perception. For Nussbaum, for instance, the 
detailed attention we put into attending to a literary depiction is an instance of the attention needed in 
moral activity [24]. Similarly, for Dewey, perception is opposed to mere recognition. Recognition for 
him is mere stereotype information upon some previously formed scheme, whereas perception means 
to “take in”, realizing that we never knew the object of perception before, that we had not seen it in 
any pregnant sense ([19], pp. 59–62). The function of art for Dewey is to focus on subdued parts of 
experience and in Deweyan terms, to create and provide access to aesthetic experiences. That means 
among other things the following, as Dewey declares in Art as Experience: “The moral function of art 
itself is to remove prejudice, do away with the scales that keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils 
due to wont and custom, perfect the power to perceive” ([19], p. 328). In such a perspective, novels 
and art in general are training tools for making us into better perceivers. 
Yet Rorty did (against what I outlined before) cherish the hope that such novels would teach us 
moral lessons. There is a tension between his hope that by reading polyphonic novels we come to see 
that any form of fixed morality stands in our way of really seeing what other people need and why they 
are suffering, and his hope that reading those novels would make us loyal to a real existing liberal 
democratic ethnos. Whenever Rorty considers political issues, the nation is the most relevant  
‘we’-identity for him when it comes to realizing the ideal of solidarity; and in his case the most 
relevant nation is the United States, which he takes to be a good example of a democratic society in “the 
West” [25], though he occasionally cannot decide whether he should criticize its realities or laud it as 
“a great country” [26]. Thus when Rorty appeals to the common identity of fellow Americans it is 
unclear if he has in mind the actual ‘we’ of identity or the America which it could be as measured  
by the ideals of his liberal democratic utopia. This tension refers to the before mentioned tension 
between the loyalty to a factual ‘we’-identity (the United States) and a normative ‘we’ of a Sellersian 
‘we-consciousness’ (the universal liberal utopian ideal of solidarity). When he states, however, that we 
should not be looking for alternative practices to real existing liberal democracies—“we do not need … 
‘a critique of liberal society’. We just need more liberal societies, and more liberal laws in force within 
each such society”—he clearly is taking sides on that matter [27]. 
In other words, Rorty’s view about novels’ potential for moral progress oscillates between the hope 
that novels would be efficient tools for subverting and destructing any form of a “morality” and the 
Humanities 2013, 2 187 
 
hope that they would be efficient propaganda tools for something like a ‘liberal morality’ that already 
exists in the US. However, that the latter hope undermines the task of subverting and destructing 
moralities is addressed by Dewey in Art as Experience: “The theories that attribute direct moral effect 
and intent to art, fail because they do not take account of the collective civilization that is the context 
in which works of art are produced and enjoyed”. Such theories “tend to extract particular works … 
form their milieu and to think of the moral function of art in terms of a strictly personal relation 
between the selected works and a particular individual. Their whole conception of morals is so 
individualistic that they miss a sense of the way in which art exercises its human function” ([19],  
pp. 348–49). What Dewey criticizes is that art is mainly seen as a function of a moral system already 
developed. For Dewey, it is the other way round: morality should be seen as a function of art. Art is 
moral by disclosure, “through imaginative vision, addressed to imaginative experience of possibilities 
that contrast with actual conditions”. He holds: “A sense of possibilities that are unrealized and that 
might be realized are when they are put in contrast with actual conditions, the most penetrating 
“criticism” of the latter that can be made. It is by a sense of possibilities opening before us that we 
become aware of constrictions that hem us in and of burdens that oppress” ([19], p. 349). 
4. Novel’s Political Function of Educating our Capacity for Criticism  
Orwell’s 1984 is another story for Rorty where we could train to become more sensitive and more 
solidary, where we could learn that our attempts for self-realization might have consequences that will 
make other people suffer. Indeed, Orwell’s 1984 may teach us that sheer brutality and the use of 
senseless violence intended to humiliate, de-humanize and de-individualize its opponents lead to cruel 
and inhuman consequences and therefore are bad. However, if ever we could draw normative 
conclusions from a book like 1984, it would be in my view political lessons about power. It would be 
the warning to be very vigilant that our political structures are organized in a way that they prevent us 
from a guy like O’Brien coming into power. I think that any kind of dystopia has its political function 
not because it makes readers more sensitive and more solidary, but rather because it is a form of  
social criticism. 
Stories can have critical, subversive power for Rorty, but they have this power only for changing 
one’s own personal vocabulary and not for social criticism. For Rorty, creating one’s original 
vocabulary and producing unprecedented redescriptions are sources for self-criticism and autonomy. 
Yet how do redescriptions tap critical potential? They do that—to take up what was already mentioned 
in the above quotation by Dewey—by contrasting actual realities with depicted possibilities. In this 
contrast lies a critical perspective on actual realities and potential for change by assessing those 
realities with hindsight from the vision of a different future. Of course, Orwell’s 1984 is a dystopian 
imagination, and in effect a prolongation and enlargement of actual realities, a narrative of how it 
might turn out in the West. The problem with Rorty’s account might be that ‘actual realities’ have an 
uncertain place in it. Orwell’s scenario in 1984 is to be compared, by Rorty’s own account, not with 
reality but with other alternate scenarios, with other novels. Yet the crucial point of 1984 is that its 
setting did resemble the totalitarian society of the Real Existing Socialism of Orwell’s time and the 
wartime life in Great Britain that had the tendency to implement totalitarian instruments like 
surveillance, censorship, sexual repression, nationalism, rigorously enforced class distinctions, cult of 
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personality, and so on. Indeed, Orwell did acknowledge that his writing since 1939 was “written, 
directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism” [28]. As Rorty’s 
antirepresentationalism rejects any form of correspondence theory, it is not possible for him that 
imaginative novels could be compared with actual reality, and thus much of the potential critical force 
that redescriptions could offer, is thrown away. 
However, Rorty could hold that he can integrate the comparing-function necessary for social 
criticism into his account. He could argue that fictional novels actually might refer to existing realities. 
Nonetheless, such realities would be nothing outside of novels but exactly and exclusively the novels 
themselves. In other words, in Rorty’s account, the comparing-function is not between novels and 
realities but between one specific narrative and alternative ones. If we understood social criticism as an 
inner-narrative comparing-function, social criticism, in order to actually criticize, would have to 
conceive the comparing-function within a discourse between competing novels. Yet is it not a strange 
way of speaking to say that fictional novels, insofar as they fulfill the function of social criticism, do 
not contrast with real or realistically possible totalitarian patterns, say censorship, but only with other 
novels or a discourse? The problem with that view seems to be that we could only contrast those social 
realities that already are present in a story. However, changing stories is not what we want exclusively, 
we rather want to change social realities. 
Rorty could reply that by changing vocabularies, we are changing realities too, or that at least we 
are changing the condition of possibility of realities. Yet this is only half the story. Changes in 
vocabulary are often only indications of actual social changes that take place somewhat ‘outside’ of 
novels. However, if we consider Dennetts report that Rorty conceded to him in private that it is indeed 
important to acknowledge the gap between appearance and reality when we, e.g., want to compare two 
maps of the countryside for reliability for example, or when we want to find out whether the accused 
did or did not commit the crime as charged. As Dennett reports, Rorty in that context spoke of 
“vegetarian” concepts of truth and reality [29]. With this in mind I should soften my criticism of Rorty 
on that matter but still reproach him for going too far in his writings with his polemic against models 
of epistemology that build their conclusions on the premise that our concepts in one way or another 
mirror realities. Because he strictly rejects any such epistemology, he has no place for the 
correspondence function between concepts and realities and by that weakens the novel’s power for 
social and political criticism. 
5. Conclusions 
Making us into better perceivers and providing us with the material to criticize our own personal 
vocabulary (and I add: social realities) are two separated functions of novels for Rorty. I now turn to 
why I think that these two functions are closer to each other than Rorty thinks they are, especially 
when one allows criticism to be more than just a tool for becoming more individual and autonomous. 
Dewey, one of Rorty’s heroes, did see that the power of perception is a prerequisite for criticism 
and that the power of moral perception has many internal similarities with criticism as a form of 
action. For Dewey, critical action should be carried out with the ideal aim of fostering experiences that 
liberate new meanings and values and help us to look at other people and the world in a different way. 
This is to say that criticism for Dewey should be “artful criticism”, to use a term of Scott Stroud [30]. 
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For Dewey, criticism is a form of action that can be executed artfully or non-artfully. If it is executed 
artfully, criticism should not be mechanical, but rather an attentive endeavor with openness to the 
present situation. For the artful critic, each claim is merely a way of using the present experience in a 
certain way. The art lies in how one focuses one’s attention on that present usage. The Deweyan notion 
of artful criticism is, evidentially, closely connected to his concept of aesthetical experience. Dewey’s 
ideal of aesthetic experience is a way of perceiving, a way of seeing the present situation as integrally 
connected to remote states as well as a way of valuing the present situation as much more than remote 
states, future goals, past events, and so forth. 
With Dewey, we could say that before there can be deliberative criticism, there must be a capacity 
to hear each other’s stories and experience the world relating to the other’s mind and body. Becoming 
open at least to the possibility of other people’s experiences or their way of meaning making is to 
develop an “epistemology of the ear” (Thomas Alexander) [31]. If criticism leads to actual changes, a 
disposition for listening to other people’s voices—that is receptivity combined with imagination—is 
necessary. Thus, criticism has a precondition that Dewey saw and that Rorty did not see, namely that 
we need to learn to listen and to watch. Art (and that of course can include novels and stories) can help 
us train such qualitative perception, and then criticism can be effective. 
The value of art’s critical potential for Dewey is not just that it urges people to take the effort to 
become more individual and more autonomous through a very private process of re-creating their 
selves by criticizing their own vocabulary. In addition to that it is that it helps to educate our will to 
reflectively recognize or maybe even understand and integrate into our lives the meanings and 
practices that lie idle in our experiences of social realities. In short, the transformative capacity of art in 
Dewey’s account of the moral function of art is art’s ability to put us in touch with a pre-discursive 
mode of experience by cultivating our receptivity to the pervasive qualitative dimension of our 
fundamental transactions in the social and political environment. Critical judgment and aesthetic-moral 
perception here are closely related. An ethics of perception already implies the claim to challenge and 
criticize our established concepts and modes of individual and social lives. And criticism, in order to 
be social, implies the readiness to be attentive to social realities, to actual conditions of other persons, 
of social structures and patterns, of processes and institutions. 
An important aspect of Deweyan artful criticism is that it is not what elitist critics do, it is what 
everyone does in certain problematic situations, namely investigating the present in light of what is not 
present, it occurs when we pass from appreciation to engaged reflection. In Experience and Nature, 
Dewey expresses this idea like this: “Criticism is not a matter of formal treatises, published articles, or 
taking up important matters for consideration in a serious way. It occurs whenever a moment is 
devoted to looking to see what sort of value is present; whenever instead of accepting a value-object 
wholeheartedly, being rapt by it, we raise even a shadow of a question about its worth, or modify our 
sense of it by even a passing estimate of its probable future” [32]. Criticism is an activity that all can 
and should take part in, whether in relation to our experience of traditional art objects in a museum, of 
political speeches or in relation to aspects of our everyday life that can be improved. Thus, for Dewey, 
art is a necessary constituent of democratic societies and not just its smooth, shiny ornamental surface. 
If art is understood as an instrument for political expression, as Mark Mattern highlighted, it  
“is a source of power for many. This is especially true for relatively marginalized individuals and 
groups who frequently find themselves locked out of mainstream and institutionalized political  
Humanities 2013, 2 190 
 
arenas” [33]. In that sense, art is and can be understood as a means of stimulating public debate and 
political deliberation. 
John Dryzek said that pragmatism’s most important contribution to the philosophical discussion 
about democracy is that it emphasizes that “deliberation in practice is often more about telling stories 
than it is about making arguments” [34]. He mainly refers to Rorty’s narrative account, which in 
Dryzek’s eyes is much better suited to represent political deliberation in deeply pluralistic democratic 
societies than models of deliberative democracy. These are essentially centered around the regulative 
ideals of consensus and truth-tracking, because it emphasizes the characteristic of political deliberation 
to be about diverse opinions that are presented in a narrative structure. One had not to go so far as to 
tax a political ‘argument’—being rhetorically and aesthetically structured and thus selective and 
shaped for certain specific political purposes—as “an attempt to lie by speaking the truth” 
(Schumpeter) [35]. That would be to deny any value of political deliberation. Sure enough, the idea 
that art in general and narratives in particular can positively influence political debate is a highly 
normative ideal, because it for one thing presupposes that people bring along the intellectual capacity 
and curiosity to engage with art that challenges (or confirms) their volitions and for the other it 
demands that we can discern art and narratives which in principle have the potential to influence from 
artworks that do not have this potential. That the latter is not only a matter of artworks’ structures or of 
the aesthetical or moral attributes they imply but also a matter of their reception, of how artworks and 
stories are conveyed. Without going into detail about this question here, in the light of what has just 
been said about dispositions for democratic citizenship, both artworks and their reception should in 
some way or another, directly or indirectly, touch upon and shed light on aspects of social or 
existential-individual realities and experiences that so far have been largely unveiled. By doing that, 
they can add an aesthetically- or a linguistically-constituted variety of opinions or ‘arguments’ to the 
public discourse. 
However, given the coherences between the capacities of criticism and aesthetic-moral perception it 
should not be forgotten that many valuable artistic contributions to political deliberation serve as 
means for resistant and oppositional political practices. Both Dewey and Rorty neglect to acknowledge 
the positive effects of conflict, disruption, competition and disharmony in democratic politics. In fact, 
art and artistic criticism—by directly provoking, antagonizing or mocking political opponents—are 
significantly successful in bringing disregarded voices into political deliberation by advancing the 
political concerns of a certain social group, spreading such concerns or motivating citizens to 
participate in political debate and vote. Only consider the latest example: Pussy Riot; or think about the 
series “Top Goon” of the Syrian artist group “Masasit Mati”. There is empirical evidence that public 
irony and ridicule are twice as successful as strategies for overcoming oppressing or illegitimate 
political regimes as revolution by force [36]. What Dewey neglects and Rorty considers but 
unfortunately limits to the private sphere is that antagonism and disruption in art and artistic criticism 
can be a valuable means for public debate. 
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